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Abstract
Zheng has recently proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independent-
private-value environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng's construction
requires novel conditions on the bidders' value distribution prole. We clarify the
restrictions implied by these conditions. Given distributions for two bidders and the
supports of the other bidders' distributions, Zheng's conditions uniquely determine
the entire distribution prole. Moreover, if the bidders' distributions have the same
support then Zheng's conditions imply that all distributions except one are identical,
so that the nal allocation is obtained after a single resale transaction, regardless of
the number of bidders.
Keywords: independent private values, optimal auction, resale, inverse virtual valuation
function
Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn. Email:
mylovanov@uni-bonn.de and ttroeger@uni-bonn.de. We thank Rod Garratt, Georg N oldeke, and Charles
Zheng for helpful comments. Financial Support by the German Science Foundation (DFG) through SFB/TR
15 \Governance and the Eciency of Economic Systems" is gratefully acknowledged.
11 Introduction
Zheng (2002) observes that \much of the auction design literature makes the unrealistic
assumption that winning bidders cannot attempt to resell the good to losing bidders." As
Zheng explains, the no-resale assumption is not innocuous. Unless the bidders are ex-ante
symmetric, optimal auctions are typically inecient in the sense that the winner is not
always the bidder with the highest valuation (Myerson (1981)). This creates an incentive
for the winning bidder to attempt to resell the good to one of the losers. The anticipation
of resale can change bidding in the initial auction so that it ceases to be optimal.
Zheng proposes an alternative auction design that takes into account the inability of the
initial seller to prohibit resale. He considers a sequential mechanism selection game where
each current owner of the good chooses her sales mechanism knowing that the winner of
today's mechanism will herself choose a sales mechanism that is optimal given that the next
winner will choose an optimal sales mechanism, and so on.
Zheng establishes conditions on the prole of the distributions of the bidders' values
such that the sequential mechanism selection game has an equilibrium where the initial
seller obtains the same prot as when she can prohibit resale. Zheng's conditions have ve
parts: Hazard Rate, Uniform Bias, Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance. The
rst two are straightforward: Hazard Rate essentially requires smoothness of the bidders'
distributions, and that every distribution has a weakly increasing hazard rate, while Uniform
Bias requires that the bidders can be ranked according to their distributions' supports and
hazard rates, where bidder 1 is the one who has the smallest support and the largest hazard
rate.
Our purpose is to clarify the restrictions that Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and
Invariance impose on the underlying distribution prole.1 This is an open issue because
the only examples of distribution proles known to satisfy Zheng's conditions are uniform
distributions (Zheng, 2002, Example 3).
1See Zheng (2002, p. 2213, p. 2215, and p. 2216) for explanations of why these conditions are crucial for
his construction.
2Technically, our crucial insight is that Resale Monotonicity and Invariance relate the
bidders' distributions at points where the bidders tie with their virtual valuations. Hence,
we analyze these conditions by using the bidders' inverse virtual valuation functions. We nd
that Resale Monotonicity is equivalent to a set of dierential inequalities in terms of inverse
virtual valuation functions, and Invariance implies a set of dierential equations in terms of
inverse virtual valuation functions (because of the stark implications of these equations, a
separate analysis of Transitivity is unnecessary).
In 2-bidder environments, Zheng assumes Hazard Rate, Uniform Bias, and Resale Mono-
tonicity, but not Transitivity or Invariance. We show that, given Hazard Rate and Uniform
Bias, Resale Monotonicity is satised whenever the density of bidder 2's distribution is weakly
decreasing (Proposition 1). If bidder 2's density is not weakly decreasing, then there exist
bidder-1 distributions such that Resale Monotonicity holds as well as bidder-1 distributions
such that Resale Monotonicity is violated (Proposition 2).
To tackle environments with n  3 bidders, Zheng assumes Transitivity and Invariance
in addition to Hazard Rate, Uniform Bias, and Resale Monotonicity. We show that for any
given prole of supports for bidders 2 to n   1, and for any given distribution of bidder n,
there exists at most one prole of distributions for bidders 2 to n   1 such that Zheng's
conditions are satised (Proposition 3). This implies, together with Zheng (2002, Example
3), that if bidder n's distribution is uniform then the distributions of bidders 2 to n 1 must
be uniform as well.
A particularly clear cut result holds if the distributions of bidders 2 to n  3 have
the same support and if Hazard Rate and Uniform Bias are taken as given. Then Resale
Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance are satised if and only if the distributions of
bidders 2 to n are identical and have a weakly decreasing density (Proposition 4). Hence,
if the distributions of bidders 2 to n have the same support and Zheng's assumptions are
satised, then the nal allocation is obtained after one resale transaction, just as in 2-bidder
environments.
In Section 2 we introduce Zheng's Assumptions 1{5 and relate them to the bidders' inverse
virtual valuation functions. Section 3 deals with 2-bidder environments. Environments with
3three or more bidders are treated in Section 4.
2 Zheng's assumptions and inverse virtual valuation
functions
This note concerns Assumptions 1-5 of Zheng (2002). For the sake of brevity, we reiterate
only those aspects of Zheng's model that are needed to state his assumptions. Consider an
independent-private-value auction environment with n  2 bidders. The distribution for the
valuation of bidder i = 1;:::;n is denoted Fi with support Ti.
Assumption 1 of Zheng consists of standard elements and needs no further discussion.
Assumption 1 (Hazard Rate) For each player i, the support Ti of Fi is convex and
bounded from below. If Ti is a non-degenerate interval, the density function fi is positive
and continuous on Ti and dierentiable in its interior, and (1   Fi(ti))=fi(ti) is a weakly
decreasing function of ti on Ti.
We add the assumptions that for all i, the support Ti is non-degenerate and bounded,
the derivative f0
i exists at the boundary of Ti, and f0
i is continuous on Ti. Let ti = minTi and
ti = maxTi. Dene the hazard rate i(ti) = fi(ti)=(1 Fi(ti)) for all ti such that Fi(ti) < 1.
The virtual valuation functions Vi (i = 1;:::;n) are dened by Vi(ti) = ti   (1  
Fi(ti))=fi(ti) (ti 2 Ti). Given the above assumptions, the derivative V 0
i exists and is contin-
uous and  1. Moreover,
Vi(Ti) = [Vi(ti);ti] (i = 1;:::;n): (1)
The inverse virtual valuation function V
 1
i is well-dened on Vi(Ti). The derivative (V
 1
i )0
is continuous and takes values in (0;1].
Assumption 2 of Zheng states that the bidders i = 1;:::;n can be ranked in terms of the
support Ti and of the virtual valuation function Vi. Observe that Assumption 2 is equivalent
4to hazard rate dominance if T1 = ::: = Tn.2
Assumption 2 (Uniform Bias) For all i;j = 1;:::;n, if i < j then Ti  Tj and Vi(x) 
Vj(x) for all x 2 Ti.
By (1) and Assumption 2,
8i;j = 1;:::;n : if i < j then Vi(Ti)  Vj(Tj): (2)
For i < j, let ij(ti) = V
 1
j (Vi(ti)). Zheng denes functions ij : Ti ! Tj implicitly by
Fj(ij(ti)) = Fj(ij(ti)) + (ij(ti)   ti)fj(ij(ti)): (3)
The ij functions play a central role in Zheng's equilibrium construction. He assumes the
following conditions.
Assumption 3 (Resale Monotonicity) For all i;j = 1;:::;n, if i < j then ij is weakly
increasing.
Assumption 4 (Transitivity) If bidder i is ranked before bidder k (i < j < k), then for
any tj less than or equal to the supremum of the range of ij, ik(
 1
ij (tj))  V
 1
k (Vj(tj)).
Assumption 5 (Invariance) For all w = 1;:::;n, and i;j > w, if ti  wi(tw) and
tj  wj(tw), then Vi(ti)  (resp. =)Vj(tj)
implies fi(wi(tw))=fi(ti)  (resp. =)fj(wj(tw))=fj(tj).3
We will evaluate the restrictions implied by these assumptions by utilizing the bidders'
inverse virtual valuation functions. The rst step towards analyzing Assumption 3 is to
2Hazard rate dominance is a stronger requirement than stochastic dominance and a weaker requirement
than likelihood ratio dominance (see, e.g., Krishna (2002, Appendix B)).
3Zheng's paper contains a typo in Assumption 5 that is corrected here. He requires that \>" implies
\>", but this is not needed and obviously is not meant because it would be violated by his own Example 3.
5simplify the denition of the ij functions as follows.









if ti < ti;
and ij(ti) = tj.







 Vj(ij(ti)) + ti | {z }
= Vi(ti)+ti
= 0: (4)
The fact that ij(ti) = tj follows because  Vi(ti)+ti = 0. The proof is completed by noting
that  Vi(ti) + ti = 1=i(ti) for all ti < ti. QED
We can now provide a direct characterization of Resale Monotonicity in terms a set of
dierential inequalities involving inverse virtual valuation functions.
Lemma 2 Let i < j. Consider distributions Fi and Fj satisfying Hazard Rate and Uniform
Bias. Then ij is weakly increasing if and only if
8v 2 (Vi(ti);ti) :
(V
 1
i )0(v)   1
V
 1




j )0(v)   1
V
 1
j (v)   v
: (5)
Proof. By Lemma 1, ij is weakly increasing if and only if the function
i(ti)
fj(ij(ti))
(ti 2 [ti;ti)) (6)













i (v)) = 1=(V
 1
i (v)   v) for all v 2 [Vi(ti);ti). Hence, (6) shows that ij is weakly
increasing if and only if
(V
 1
i (v)   v)fj(V
 1
j (v)) (v 2 [Vi(ti);ti))











i (v)   v
V
 1








(v 2 [Vi(ti);ti)) (7)
is weakly decreasing. Because the derivatives f0
j and f0
i are continuous, the derivative Z0
exists and is continuous. Hence, Z is weakly decreasing if and only if Z0  0, which is
equivalent to the condition (5). QED
The left-hand side of (5) equals the derivative of ln(V
 1
i (v) v). Thus, Resale Monotonic-
ity requires, for every i < n, that the logarithm of the dierence between bidder i's actual
valuation V
 1
i (v) and her virtual valuation v is a suciently steep (downward-sloping) func-
tion of v.
It is not possible to simplify (5) by using additional properties of virtual valuation func-
tions, because there are essentially no additional properties: any continuously dierentiable
function dened on an interval [ti; t] ( t < ti) with derivative not smaller than 1 and val-
ues below the identity function can be extended to the virtual valuation function of some
distribution Fi satisfying Assumption 1 (see Krishna, 2002, p. 255).
The implications of Invariance derived in the following two lemmas are so strong that it
is not necessary to deal with Transitivity separately.
Lemma 3 Suppose that n  3 and Hazard Rate, Uniform Bias, and Invariance hold. Then




Proof. Let 2  i  n   1. To show that fi is decreasing, consider t;t0 2 [ti;ti] such that
t < t0. Let, j = n, w = 1, tw = t1, and tj = tn = V  1
n (Vi(t)). By Assumption 2 and Lemma
1, t;t0  1i(t1) = ti and tn  1j(t1) = tn.
7By Assumption 5, since Vi(t) = Vn(V  1




















Combining (8) and (9), we obtain fi(t)  fi(t0).
To show that fn is weakly decreasing on [V  1
n (Vn 1(tn 1));V  1
n (tn 1)], one repeats the
above argument with i = n, j = n   1, and tn = V
 1
n 1(Vn(t)). QED
The following lemma shows that Invariance implies certain dierential equations for the
inverse virtual valuation functions. In the proof of Proposition 3 below we will use these
equations to compute the virtual valuation functions of the bidders 2 to n   1 from the
virtual valuation function of bidder n.4
Lemma 4 Suppose that n  3 and Hazard Rate, Uniform Bias, and Invariance hold. Then,
for i = 2;:::;n   1,
8v 2 [Vi(ti);ti) :
2(V
 1
i )0(v)   1
V
 1
i (v)   v
=
2(V  1
n )0(v)   1
V  1
n (v)   v
: (10)
Proof. Let i 2 f2;:::;ng and w = 1. By (2) there exist for any v 2 [Vi(ti);ti] types
ti 2 Ti and tn 2 Tn such that v = Vi(ti) = Vn(tn). By Lemma 1, ti  ti = 1i(t1) and
tn  tn = 1n(t1). Hence, Assumption 5 with t1 = t1 yields that

















4It is tempting to think that setting V
 1
i (v) = V  1
n (v) for all v 2 [Vi(ti);ti) solves the dierential equation
in Lemma 4. However, this is wrong unless ti = tn because V  1
n (v) > v for all v < tn and V
 1
i (ti) = ti.















An analogous formula holds for fi(V
 1
i (v)). Hence, (11) implies
8v 2 [Vi(ti);ti) :
1
V  1





















Taking the derivative on both sides of (12), we obtain
8v 2 [Vi(ti);ti) :
2(V  1
n )0(v)   1
(V  1
























Dividing (13) by (12) yields (10). QED
3 Two-bidder environments
In environments with two bidders, the conditions assumed by Zheng are Hazard Rate, Uni-
form Bias, and Resale Monotonicity. Our rst result shows that Resale Monotonicity is
satised whenever the distribution of bidder 2 has a weakly decreasing density. One can
prove this by observing that the left-hand side of (5) with i = 1 is  0 and the right-hand
side of (5) with j = 2 is  0. Below we provide an alternative proof that uses Lemma 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose that n = 2. Consider any pair of distributions F1 and F2 satisfying
Hazard Rate and Uniform Bias. If f2 is weakly decreasing, then Resale Monotonicity is
satised.
Proof. Consider any pair of distributions F1 and F2 satisfying Assumption 1 and As-
sumption 2. Then, 2(t2) and 12(t1) are increasing. If f2(t2) is weakly decreasing on [t2;t2],
then f2(12(t1)) is weakly decreasing on [t1;t1]. Hence, 12 is weakly increasing by Lemma
1. QED
9Things are less straightforward if bidder 2's density is not weakly increasing. The right-
hand side of (5) with j = 2 is then < 0 for some v =  v. Resale Monotonicity can still hold
(for example, when both bidders have the same distribution F1 = F2). The result below
shows, however, that one can always nd bidder-1 distributions (with the same support as
the bidder-2 distribution) such that Resale Monotonicity is violated. The proof works by
constructing bidder 1's distribution such that the left-hand side of (5) with i = 1 equals 0
at v =  v.
Proposition 2 Suppose that n = 2. Consider any distribution F2 that satises Hazard Rate.
If f2 is not weakly decreasing, then there exist distributions for bidder 1 such that Hazard
Rate and Uniform Bias are satised, T1 = T2, and Resale Monotonicity is violated.
Proof. Because f2 is not weakly decreasing, there exists  t2 2 (t2;t2) such that f0
2( t2) > 0.
Hence, V 0




0( v) < 1=2: (14)
Let t1 = t2 and t1 = t2. A continuous function 1 : [t1;t1) ! [0;1) is the hazard rate of
























  if t 2 [t1; t2];
> 2(t) if t 2 ( t2;t1];
and such that 1 is weakly increasing and continuously dierentiable. Given our construction
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 are satised. Also, V1(t1) = t1   1=  for all t1 2 [t1; t2].
10Hence,












By (15),  v 2 [t1   1= ; t2   1= ]. Evaluating (16) yields that at v =  v the left-hand side
of (5) with i = 1 equals 0. By (14), the right-hand side of (5) with j = 2 is < 0 at v =  v.
Hence, Assumption 3 is violated by Lemma 2. QED
4 Environments with three or more bidders
In environments with three or more bidders, the conditions assumed by Zheng are Hazard
Rate, Uniform Bias, Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance.
The following result conrms Zheng's own assessment that Invariance is \very restrictive"
(2002, p. 2217): if supports are given, then the distribution for bidder n pins down a unique
candidate distribution for every bidder 2 to n   1 (but imposes no restriction on bidder 1's
distribution).
Proposition 3 Let n  3. Then, for any given prole of supports T2  :::  Tn 1, and
any distribution Fn, there exists at most one prole F2, ..., Fn 1, such that Hazard Rate,
Uniform Bias, and Invariance hold.
Proof. Let i 2 f2;:::;n   1g. Given the virtual valuation function Vn, we show that
there exists at most one distribution Fi such that Hazard Rate, Uniform Bias, and Invariance
hold. Because we want to apply Lemma 4, we consider the linear (inhomogeneous) ordinary
dierential equation
2g




n )0(v)   1
V  1
n (v)   v
(v 2 [Vn(tn);tn)):
We distinguish cases where ti < tn and where ti = tn.
Let ti < tn. Then the function h is continuous at v = ti. Hence, standard results on
dierential equations imply that the equation (17) together with the boundary condition
g(ti) = ti has a unique solution gi on [Vn(tn);ti].
11Now consider two distributions Fi and  Fi for bidder i with support Ti such that Hazard
Rate, Uniform Bias, and Invariance hold; denote by Vi and  Vi the corresponding virtual
valuation functions. Without loss of generality, Vi(ti)   Vi(ti). Using Lemma 4,
8v 2 [ Vi(ti);ti) : V
 1
i (v) = gi(v) =  V
 1
i (v): (18)
Setting v =  Vi(ti), (18) implies V
 1
i ( Vi(ti)) =  V
 1
i ( Vi(ti)) = ti, hence  Vi(ti) = Vi(ti). To-
gether with (18) we obtain Vi =  Vi and thus Fi =  Fi.
Let ti = tn. Because h(v) ! 1 as v ! ti, standard uniqueness results for dierential
equations do not apply. However, g = V  1
n obviously solves (17) on [Vn(tn);tn) and satises
the boundary condition g(tn) = tn. Next, we show
(*) if a function k solves (17) on [v;tn) for some v < tn, satises the boundary
condition k(tn) = tn, and has the following additional property,
9^ v < tn8v 2 [^ v;tn) : k(v)  V
 1
n (v); (19)
then k = V  1
n on [v;tn).
Because V  1
n   k solves the homogeneous dierential equation 2g0(v) = g(v)h(v),







n (v) (v 2 [v;tn)) (20)



















n (tn 1)] : V
0
n(t)  2: (22)
Because tn = ti  tn 1  tn, we have V  1
n (tn 1) = tn and thus
V
 1
n (Vn 1(tn 1)) < V
 1
n (tn 1) = tn:
Hence, (22) implies (V  1
n )0(v)  1=2 for all v 2 N := [Vn 1(tn 1);tn) 6= ;. Hence, h(v)  0
for all v 2 N. Hence, (21) implies k0(v)  (V  1
n )0(v) for all v 2 N \ [v;tn). Together with
12k(tn) = tn = V  1
n (tn) this implies k(v)  V  1
n (v) for all v 2 N \ [v;tn). Hence,   0 by
(20). Thus,  = 0 and therefore k = V  1
n , showing (*).
Now, as in the case ti < tn, consider two distributions Fi and  Fi for bidder i with support
Ti such that Hazard Rate, Uniform Bias, and Invariance hold; denote by Vi and  Vi the
corresponding virtual valuation functions. Without loss of generality, Vi(ti)   Vi(ti). By
Uniform Bias, V
 1
i (v)  V  1
n (v) and  V
 1
i (v)  V  1
n (v) for all v 2 [ Vi(ti);tn). By Lemma 4,
both V
 1
i and  V
 1
i solve (17) on [ Vi(ti);tn). Hence, by (*),
8v 2 [ Vi(ti);ti) : V
 1
i (v) = V
 1
n (v) =  V
 1
i (v);
which implies Fi =  Fi by the same arguments as in the case ti < tn. QED
It is interesting to contrast Proposition 3 with Zheng (2002, Example 3), where it is
shown that Zheng's conditions are satised if every bidder's distribution is uniform (on a
possibly dierent interval for each bidder). Proposition 3 reveals that if the distribution for
bidder n is uniform, then Zheng's conditions are satised only if the distributions for bidders
2 to n   1 are uniform as well.
The last result concerns environments where the distributions of bidders 2 to n have the
same support.
Proposition 4 Let n  3. Suppose that Hazard Rate and Uniform Bias hold, and T2 =
::: = Tn. Then Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance, are satised if and only
if F2 = ::: = Fn and the density fi (i  2) is weakly decreasing.
Proof. \if": The verication of Assumption 3 is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.
Assumptions 4 and 5 are straightforward.
\only if": Suppose that Assumptions 1{5 hold. Consider any Fn. By Proposition 3 and
\if", F2 = ::: = Fn. By Lemma 3, the density fi (i  2) is weakly decreasing. QED
On the one hand, Proposition 4 considerably extends Zheng (2002, Example 3), allowing
for a large class of non-uniform distributions for bidders 2 to n, and any bidder-1 distribution
13that satises Hazard Rate. On the other hand, the condition that the distributions for
bidders 2 to n are identical renders Zheng's n-bidder equilibrium construction essentially
equivalent to the 2-bidder case: the resale mechanism used by bidder 1 is symmetric across
bidders 2 to n so that the nal allocation is obtained after one resale transaction.
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